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ven Americans who have only a vague knowledge of health pol-
icy know that the U.S. is different. We do not have "socialized
medicine," like our European or Canadian neighbors. We be-
lieve that health care is not rationed here, and that, unlike citizens of
other nations, we do not have to wait in long queues when we need
medical care. We believe that U.S. health care is the best in the world.
At the same time, the U.S. spends more on health care - both per
capita and as percentage of gross domestic product (GDP) - than
other nations do. One in six non-elderly Americans has no health in-
surance, and voluminous studies show that lack of health insurance
has a dramatic effect on both access to care and on health status.' Fur-
thermore, on many of the most important indicators of population
health, such as infant mortality and life expectancy, the U.S. scores
worse than do other nations.
How do we reconcile our beliefs with these facts? Why do other na-
tions have universal health coverage while we do not? What, in fact,
do other nations do when it comes to health care? And bow do they
do it? Why can't - or don't or won't - we do what they do?
This article addresses these questions. It begins with an overview
of the public health insurance systems found in countries with eco-
nomic and political systems similar to our own, exploring the struc-
tural and operational underpinnings of these systems and comparing
their cost and performance to that found in the U.S. It then consid-
ers the legal, political and social factors that account for the profound
differences between our system and the systems of other nations.
What Do Other Nations Do,
and How Do They Do It?
All other developed nations of the world, including developed coun-
tries in Western Europe, Asia, North and South America, and on the
Pacific Rim, provide health care for all or most of their residents. Al-
though private health insurance products are available for purchase
on a voluntary basis in virtually every country, no other developed
country relies on private insurance as does the United State to pro-
vide primary coverage for its population. 2 All developed nations have
recognized that voluntary private insurance cannot cover everyone,
(as it does not in the U.S.) and have developed some form of public
health insurance.
3
Two Basic Models of Health Insurance
Two primary models can be found in the world: social insurance and
national health insurance. Each term refers to a specific approach to
the task of financing and organizing a nation's system for providing
personal health care. The first, and older, model is social insurance,
often called the Bismarck model after the German leader who es-
tablished the first social health insurance system.4 The second, more
recent, is the national health insurance model, often called the Bev-
eridge model after Lord Beveridge who proposed this approach for
the U.K. during World War I1.5
Chancellor Bismarck established the German social insurance sys-
tem in 1883 in an attempt to turn back the tide of socialism that he
feared would engulf Germany.6 Under the German system as it has
developed, most citizens have an obligation to secure health insurance
coverage, which in turn is paid for, usually by a deduction from earn-
ings, on the basis of the insured's income rather than the insured's risk
status or family size in order to ensure affordability. In Germany the
conceptual foundation of health insurance lies in a belief that mem-
bers of a society have obligations to each other, a concept referred to
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as "solidarity," rather than in the belief that Why do oth(
individuals are responsible only for them-
selves. This insurance obligation is effectu- universal healt
ated through a system that collects the we do not? V
revenues needed to sustain health care. Em- other nations(
ployers and employees each contribute a per-
centage of wages to social insurance funds; to health car
in turn, these funds provide health insur- they do it? Wh
ance for employees and their families. Most
persons in Germany whose income falls or won't we d
below a certain level (46,350 Euros in 2004)
must participate in this social health insur-
ance program.7 Persons with incomes above this level are not required
to participate, and many buy private insurance instead. However,
about 60 percent of all of these upper income persons in fact partici-
pate in the public system, because family coverage costs extra in the
private system but not in the public, private insurance rates are risk-
adjusted while social insurance rates are not, and persons who opt out
of the social insurance system may not in most instances ever return.8
Social insurance funds in Germany are not administered by the
government, but rather by non-profit organizations, which are ac-
countable to their members (and their members' employers). 9 There
are many of these funds, some tied to a particular employer, others
occupation based, and still others locally-based.'0 Thus employees of
Mercedes or BMW would be insured through a company fund; farm-
ers, miners or seamen are covered by special funds, and many peo-
ple are insured through a general locally-based fund or through spe-
cial funds that used to only cover white collar workers." All social
insurance funds operate within a framework of laws, and all cover es-
sentially the same services and charge similar (though not identical)
premiums.12 In order to ensure the stability of the health funds - and
thus the effectuation of a truly nationwide system - health plans that
have younger and less costly members must transfer money through
a risk-equalization scheme to the plans that have older and more ex-
pensive patients, but the plans also compete with each other for
members and thus have some incentive to keep their premiums
down.'
3
Health insurers have traditionally paid hospitals on the basis of
negotiated budgets, though Germany is moving toward payment
on a diagnosis-related group (DRG) basis. 4 Physicians and dentists
in Germany who furnish health care to plan members are organized
into corporate bodies that resemble unions.15 In other words, while
physicians and dentists are private businessmen, they negotiate with
the health insurers collectively, much like an independent practice
association would do in the U.S. In recent years these corporate en-
tities have negotiated with social insurers for a fixed budget, which
they have allocated among their members on a fee-for-service basis.
The method for allocating this budget among physicians is com-
plex and somewhat resembles in its formula the U.S. Medicare Re-
source Based Relative Value Scale, (RBRVS) which is a weighted
fee-for-service payment scheme. Under the German system, each
doctor sends his or her claims to the physician's organization for the
region in which the doctor is located. Claims are coded for a certain
number of points for each service, with more complex services
weighted for more points than simpler services. 16 The total physician
budget for a geographic region is divided once each quarter by the
total number of points billed that quarter, in order to reach a figure
known as a point value. This conversion factor is then multiplied by
the number of points billed by each doctor to figure out how much
that doctor has earned.' 7 While this is a simplified rendition of the
payment formula, the bottom line is that under the German system,
physicians work under a global budget that rewards those who work
harder while paying less to those who provide fewer services.' 8 The
system realizes for the insurer the benefits of capitation for control-
ling costs, but at the same time offers the provider fee-for-service
er nations have
:h coverage while
That, in fact, do
lo when it comes
e? And how do
iy can't - or don't
o what they do?
incentives to provide the insured patient all
needed services.
For each component of the health care
sector (physician services, hospitals, phar-
maceuticals, etc) and in each region, bud-
gets in Germany are established globally
within a framework of "premium stability:'
This framework limits the rate of increase
in social insurance premiums to the rate of
increase in inflation generally and tends to
ensure that practice style and practice
choices evolve within a fundamental envi-
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ronment of overall health care spending control.' 9 When necessary,
doctors are required to accept lower payments for what they do, in
lieu of the insurers trying to directly control the manner in which doc-
tors choose to practice. But this strategy has resulted in increasingly
acrimonious relations between providers and insurers, and Germany
is trying to find other ways of holding down costs, including managed
care approaches that more directly affect practice style itself.20
The social insurance model created in Germany has been adopted
in much of the world. Other central European countries, including
Austria, Switzerland, France, Belgium, and the Netherlands have
social insurance systems, as do many South American and Asian
countries for at least part of their workforce.2 ' Many of the emerging
democracies of Eastern Europe have also embraced the social insur-
ance model. Part A of the U.S. Medicare program in most respects re-
sembles a social insurance system. Though these systems vary in
many important respects, in each one health insurance is financed
primarily by payroll taxes or wage-based premiums, and services are
purchased from independent health care providers who often are in
private practice.
If the social insurance model was adopted by conservative gov-
ernments to suppress the growth of socialism in the late 19th and
early 20th century, the national health insurance model emerged
from the triumph of socialism in Europe after World War 11.22 The
United Kingdom had adopted a limited social insurance system in
1911, but many people were excluded from it, and the U.K. emerged
from WWII determined to provide health care as a right to its entire
population.22 Access to health care would no longer depend on be-
longing to a social insurance plan (which was usually, in some sense,
employment-related), but rather would be free at point-of-service to
all residents. Thus, universal coverage was created independent of the
economic or employment status of any individual.
The English NHS is financed through general revenue taxation.
These funds are administered by local units called primary care
trusts. These units purchase services from NHS hospital trusts, which
are currently public corporations, as well as from general practition-
ers, who are private businessmen. 2 4 These services are then provided
to the general public, in most instances without cost, although co-pay-
ments are imposed for some things like drugs, and a few services -
like most dental care - are provided mainly in the private sector.
25
The U.K., like many European countries, has a strong gatekeeper
system. Every Briton has a general practitioner (GP), and a patient's
first contact with the health care system is almost always with the
GP. 26 GPs still make house calls in the U.K., and the level of satisfac-
tion with primary care in the U.K. is very high.2 7 Specialist services,
including surgery, are only provided through hospitals and upon re-
ferral from a GP.
Many nations have adopted the national health insurance model
of public health insurance in the past half century, although, again,
in each nation the model looks somewhat different. 28 Canada, Aus-
tralia, the Scandinavian countries, Spain, Portugal, Italy, and some
Latin American and Asian countries have national health insurance
systems. Other countries, particularly less developed countries, pro-
vide services through public hospitals and clinics without necessarily
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developing a full and comprehensive national system of health care
finance that would be essential to make such a network of services
accessible to all persons. Our own Medicaid program, as well as our
veterans', military, and Indian health services, resemble the "national
health insurance" model, in that all use general revenue funds to pay
for health services, but they are different in that their coverage is lim-
ited to certain narrowly delineated populations, which may even, as
with Medicaid, vary from state to state.
In virtually all countries, voluntary private health insurance of the
sort sold in the U.S. to both groups and individuals continues to exist,
although it serves different functions in different countries. In some,
such as Germany and the Netherlands, it covers wealthy people who
are not covered by social insurance.2 9 In others, such as Canada, it
covers services such as pharmaceuticals, which are not universally
covered by public insurance. In yet others, such as France, it covers
cost-sharing obligations, much like our own Medigap policies. In
still others, such as the U.K. or Australia, it allows privately insured
persons to jump the queue and get services faster or more conve-
niently than publicly insured patients.
Coverage and Benefits
Countries that have national health insurance programs cover all of
their citizens and long-term residents, although in most countries in-
dividuals can choose to carry private insurance and obtain services
privately.3 0 Some countries with social insurance funds, such as
France or Austria, cover their entire populations as well.31 Others,
however, such as Germany and the Netherlands, only require people
whose income falls below a certain level to be part of the social in-
surance program.3 2 Although people with higher incomes can choose
to be uninsured, few make this choice. 33 In Australia, government
subsidies are available that cover 30 percent of the cost of private in-
surance for hospital care, while tax penalties are imposed on higher
income persons who choose not to purchase private insurance.
34
This results in about 43 percent of the population being privately in-
sured for hospital care. 35 In several of the southern European nations,
many people choose to purchase care privately, even though everyone
is covered by national health insurance, because they believe that they
will get better care or more attention from their providers.
a
3
A number of countries apply means tests for determining cover-
age for certain services or for determining the applicability or level
of cost-sharing. The Irish health care system is partially means tested:
only low income holders of medical cards (about a third of the pop-
ulation) have free access to general practitioner services, and higher
income people without medical cards must pay a co-payment for
hospital and pharmacy services under some circumstances. 37 In the
U.K. where long-term nursing home care is primarily regarded as a
social service, nursing homes are publicly funded only for those who
do not have the means to pay privately.38 Pharmaceutical coverage in
the U.K. is also means tested to the extent that the system waives re-
quired co-payments for low-income persons, although the govern-
ment also waives co-payments for children, the elderly, and persons
with certain chronic conditions.39 No developed nation other than the
U.S., however, makes access to public health insurance depend totally
on economic "medical dependency" (Medicaid), or on age and dis-
ability status (Medicare). And no other developed country has nearly
as high a proportion of its population uninsured.
Social insurance and national health insurance programs vary
somewhat in the benefits they offer. The Canadian health insurance
program, for example, only requires the provinces to cover hospital,
physician, and surgical dental services, though most provinces also
cover pharmaceutical costs for at least some of their residents. Cov-
erage in Australia is limited to hospital, physician, and pharmaceu-
tical care.4' Most countries do not cover nursing home care or cover
it as a social service rather than a health care service.
4 2 In some coun-
tries some benefits that are nominally covered are in fact not gener-
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ally available because of high cost-sharing obligations, limited cov-
erage, or lack of provider participation.
Delivering Health Care In Other Nations
Though public finance of health care services is quite common in
other countries, public provision of health care services is less uni-
versal. In most national health insurance countries, many health care
services are furnished by private entities and health professionals in
private practice. In few countries, for example, does the government
directly employ primary care physicians or dentists.4 3 Pharmaceuti-
cals and medical devices are generally produced by private manu-
facturers and sold through private pharmacies or medical equip-
ment suppliers. In most national health insurance countries public
hospitals are dominant, but in some private nonprofit or private hos-
pitals also exist.44 Private hospitals are even more common in social
insurance countries.
4 5
What Do We Get for Our Money Here,
and Why are Our Costs So Much Higher?
No other country spends as much on health care as does the U.S. As
shown on the accompanying table, social insurance countries gener-
ally spend more on health care than do countries with national health
insurance. The table, derived from a recent study of international
health care pricing,4 6 illustrates the differences among nations in
health care spending as a percentage of GDP and in absolute dollar
expenditures. To be sure, some of these differences may be attribut-
able to the fact that nations classify health spending differently; for
example, many government-borne costs of long term care, which are
classified as health expenditures in this nation, may be treated as so-
cial welfare spending in other nations.47 But even when these differ-
ences of classification are taken into account, the U.S. spends more.
What does the U.S. get in return for its higher expenditures? Cer-
tainly not better health status. Life expectancy for males at birth is
Personal Health Care Spending: U.S. and Selected
Countries, 2000
Country Health expenditures


















Source: G.E Anderson, et al. Health Affairs
75.7 in the U.K., 77.6 in Sweden, 75.6 in Germany, 75.8 in the Nether-
lands, but only 74.4 in the U.S. 48 Infant mortality rates stand at 5.5
deaths per one thousand live births in the U.K., and 3.7 and 4.3 re-
spectivelyin Sweden and Germany; the comparable figure for the U.S.
is 6.8.
4 9
Health status, of course, depends on diet, housing conditions and
societal inequality, and not just on health care. But it would also ap-
pear that far higher spending on health care in the U.S. fails to assure
residents better or more accessible health care. Indeed, by some mea-
sures we get less actual health care than do residents of other coun-
tries, although by other measures, we receive the same or slightly
more. During the year 2000, for example, the U.K. had 151 hospital
admissions per 1000 population, Germany had 205, and the U.S. had
only 118.50 The U.K. had .9 acute care hospital days per capita, Ger-
SYMPOSIUM
many, 1.9, the U.S. only .7.51 The U.K. had 5.4 physician visits per
capita, the Netherlands 5.9, and the U.S., 5.8.52 On average, the U.S.
uses 30 percent more actual health care inputs per person (such as
physician time or hospital days) than the U.K., while spending 75 per-
cent more than the U.K. per person, while the U.S. uses 15 percent




Some countries that spend less on health care than we spend also
explicitly ration access to services. In the U.K, for example, people
often have to wait to see a specialist, and then must wait again for
surgery that the specialist may deem necessary. Waits are particularly
common for certain conditions such as varicose veins, hernias,
cataracts, or painful joints - problems that have more to do with qual-
ity of life than with the preservation of life.54 Repeated efforts to
clear waiting lists have proven unsuccessful.
In the U.S., health care access is also rationed, however, although
not overtly and not for certain populations. Affluent and well insured
persons have ready access to the most advanced and sophisticated
forms of health care, regardless of whether it is required or elective. But
those Americans who cannot afford to pay for health care and do not
have health insurance are effectively denied access to non-emergency
care.55 Persons who have lower incomes and are publicly insured,
who are underinsured in relation to their financial circumstances (as
a result of high deductibles and cost sharing as well as limited cover-
age), or who are completely uninsured, may wait a long time for care
or go without it completely.
Waiting lists are essentially a mea-
sure of the gap between need for care If the social ins
as professionally determined and its adopted by consen
actual availability; that is, a person is
on a waiting list only because a doc- suppress the grow
tor has determined that that person late 19th and ear
needs care not yet available. One
study that attempted to quantify the national health
gap between need for care and its emerged from the
availability found that the effects of in Europe afti
the implicit limitations on health
care access among uninsured per-
sons in the U.S. were more severe than those imposed by the explicit
lists in the U.K.
5 6
Even more important, perhaps, nations with national health sys-
tems whose spending levels approach those seen in the U.S., such as
Germany or Switzerland, do not have serious problems with waiting
lists. 57 In other words, nations appear to be able to achieve near-uni-
versal health coverage while spending less and without lengthy waits
for necessary care.
Waiting lists are not just a function of health care expenditures,
moreover, but also of health system organization and the behavior of
the health care sector. Waiting times in England vary dramatically
from procedure to procedure and tend to be worst for conditions that
are of little interest to doctors. 58 Perversely, hospitals there have some
incentive to maintain lengthy lists, because from time to time they are
offered financial incentives by government programs aimed at re-
ducing waiting times. Similarly, many doctors have little incentive to
reduce waiting times because patients who get tired of waiting can
pay privately to have the same procedures done expeditiously by the
same doctors.
59
Moreover, factors other than rationing are equally or more impor-
tant in explaining international differences in health care costs. One
of the most important factors is that we simply pay higher prices for
health care services in the U.S. than do other countries. The average
U.S. expenditure per hospital day in 1999 was $1859, three times the
median for the developed countries that are members of the Organi-
zation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). 60 The
average physician salary in the U.S. is nearly twice that of Germany,
and nearly four times that of the U.K.61 We also, of course, spend far
more on the administration of our health care system. 62 Our highly
fragmented health insurance system requires health care institutions
and professionals to hire numerous personnel for billing who are
unnecessary in unitary systems. Private insurance also costs far more
than public insurance. Public systems do not spend the money spent
by private insurance companies on marketing, underwriting, and
profit. The U.S. pays a very high price for maintaining a market-
based health care system, and much of the money we spend does not
produce health care goods or services.
Another major difference can be seen in U.S. spending on health
care technology. For example, in 2000, the U.S. maintained 8.1 MRI
units per million inhabitants, compared to 3.9 in the U.K. and 6.2 in
Germany.63 We had 13.6 CT scanners per million compared to 6.5 per
million in the U.K. and 8.2 per million in Canada; on the other hand,
Germany had 17.1 per million.64 Technology that would only be avail-
able in regional medical centers in some countries is available not only
in community hospitals but in clinics and even physicians' offices in
the U.S. While this means that these technologies are immediately
available to Americans, it also means that they are used more often
in the U.S. In 1999 U.S. physicians performed 388.1 coronary angio-
plasties per 100,000 population compared to 51 in the U.K. and
165.7 in Germany.65 Kidney dialysis rates were 86.5 per 100,000
compared to 27 in the U.K. and 64 in Germany.
66
For all of our technology, however, there is little evidence that the
quality of care is better in the U.S.
than in other countries. A recent
urance model was
ative governments to
th of socialism in the
ly 20th century, the
tinsurance model
triumph of socialism
er World War II.
study comparing the performance
of the U.S. health care system with
those of four other countries using
nineteen process and outcome in-
dicators (such as cancer or trans-
plant survival rates or vaccination
rates), found that the U.S. scored
best on three indicators, worst on
two, and somewhere in the middle
on the others.
67
There is also little evidence that
consumers in the U.S. are more satisfied with the quality of health
care than are consumers of health care in other nations. A recent five-
country survey of "sicker adults," for example, found that 44 percent
of U.S. respondents were dissatisfied with their care, compared to 31
percent of U.K. respondents, and 36 percent of Canadians; while 23
percent of U.S. respondents believed that a mistake had been made
in their medical care in the past 2 years, compared to 20 percent of
Canadian and 13 percent of U.K. respondents. Fifty-eight percent
of U.S. respondents rated their doctors as excellent or very good on
diagnosing their medical problem, compared to 52 percent of Cana-
dian and 57 percent of U.K. respondents; while 40 percent of U.S.
respondents reported difficulty in seeing a specialist when needed,
compared to 53 percent of Canadian respondents and 38 percent of
U.K. respondents. 6 In a 2001 survey of citizens' views of access to and
quality of care, 57 percent of U.S., 53 percent of U.K. and 54 percent
of Canadian respondents rated overall medical care as excellent or
very good, while of respondents who had either themselves been hos-
pitalized or had a family member hospitalized in the past 2 years, 50
percent of U.S., 54 percent of Canadian, and 48 percent of U.K. re-
spondents rated care as excellent or very good.
69
Perhaps the single most important factor underlying lower over-
all and per capita health care spending in countries with national
health services is that most funds for health care flow through a sin-
gle, central budget.70 The health budgets of nations with tax-financed
national health services are visible and public and must compete
with other funding priorities, such as education or defense. Further-
more, it is hard to grow a publicly accountable health budget, because
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nowhere in the world is raising taxes pop- No other coun
ular. Health services must learn to make
do, therefore, on available funds, much on health c
In social insurance countries, funding United States
does not flow through a central general bud-
get, and is less well controlled; nonetheless
it is still subject to government oversight and is generally held in
check.71 As noted above, budgets for specific health sectors allow
reasonably tight control of expenditures.
In the U.S., by contrast, funds flow from a multitude of sources,
such as general revenues appropriated by federal and state govern-
ments, payroll taxes, premiums paid directly to thousands of indi-
vidual insurance plans by employers and employees (rather than into
a visible central fund) and extensive out-of-pocket payments by in-
dividuals and families. As a result, there is little chance for either
discipline or control. Indeed, even in the case of the U.S. Medicare
program, which is financed in a unified fashion and centrally ad-
ministered, recent legislation adding prescription drug coverage
plans to Medicare creates the very type of private and decentralized
purchasing scheme that characterizes health expenditures for the
non-Medicare population, and that makes budgeting and cost con-
tainment so difficult to achieve.
Other countries are also able to control their expenditures because
they have a more limited understanding of legal rights within their
health care systems than we do. While it is true that U.S. employers
have the option not to provide health plans to their workers, if they
do, the laws that govern workplace benefits - in particular the Em-
ployee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) gives covered per-
sons the legal power to enforce benefit rights in court.72 Medicare and
Medicaid, the nation's primary publicly financed health insurance
programs, both create legal entitlements. If beneficiaries or recipients
are denied services, they can go to court and demand that the service
be supplied.
73
The British, on the other hand, do not have individual entitle-
ments to health care.74 Rather, the NHS has an obligation to provide
health care services to the British public within the constraints of
available resources. In recent cases the courts have asked local health
authorities (which preceded the current primary care trusts as local
purchasers) to justify their decisions denying services, but the re-
sponsibility of the NHS is merely to act reasonably, not to provide any
particular service to any particular patient.7"
Germans do have rights to particular services. These rights can be
enforced through a separate system of social courts whose jurisdiction
extends to disputes between health insurers and their members.
76
But the courts have become increasingly deferential to the coverage de-
cisions of health insurers and their corporate representatives, seem-
ingly realizing that resources are limited.77 Further, even if a social in-
surer has the obligation to provide a service, payment formulas and
negotiated budgets act to limit total payments for provider claims.
Thus the breadth of population coverage seen in other nations is to
some extent offset by the fragility of the legal protections which are
conferred on beneficiaries for coverage of services and on providers for
payment for services. Access to care is universal, but not unlimited.
Indeed, providing near universal access at a much lower cost is not
easy. In virtually every nation, providers claim that they are under-
paid, and strikes for higher payments are not unknown. Hard bar-
gaining with providers is the norm. In some countries (though not in
all), health care facilities are dingy and not always clean. The expan-
sive hospital atriums and sparkling waiting rooms that we have come
to expect are not standard in much of the world. But most other
countries are able to muddle on, producing adequate (and often ex-
cellent) health care, making it available to all, and still holding the line
on cost. In the end, most other countries manage - unlike the U.S. -
to provide universal and comprehensive coverage for health care that
is more or less equivalent to the care offered here.
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t;ry spends as Why Don't We Do It The Way
are as does the Other Countries Do?
If other countries can have universal or
of America. near universal coverage of their popula-
tions and spend less on health care than we
do, without obvious sacrifices in quality,
why can't we do the same? Why does it seem to be our fate to have
the most expensive health care system in the world and still have over
43 million uninsured persons?
Volumes have been written on the topic of American exceptional-
ism in health policy, and only the briefest survey of this literature is
possible here.78 Explanations tend to focus on five factors, each of
which seems to play a role, though commentators disagree on their
relative importance: U.S. political institutions; the U.S. social culture
and character; a weak left and the limited strength of unions in the
U.S.; the political power of provider and insurer interest groups; and
the strength of path dependency.
U.S. Political Institutions
First, the unusual character of American political institutions makes
radical innovation very difficult. A U.S. President is the leader of his
party, but not necessarily of the government in the same sense as a
British prime minister is head of the government. It is possible in the
U.S. for Presidents to confront Congresses of different parties, with
the result that efforts at reform get hopelessly mired in partisan pol-
itics. Even when one party controls the presidency and both Houses,
as was the case during 1993 and 1994 when President Clinton's na-
tional health reform plan collapsed in spectacular failure, the mi-
nority may be large enough, and their ability to use the arcane rules
of debate strong enough, to defeat even a popular measure. The fac-
tiousness of the majority can, of course, achieve the same result.
Most European nations have parliamentary governments, in which
the executive and legislative branches are controlled by the same po-
litical party or governing coalition.79 Party discipline is stronger than
in the U.S., and when it really matters, party leadership can force
back-benchers to tow the line.8 0 Of course, few countries have two
party governments, as we do in the U.S., and coalition governments
bring their own problems and complications, 8' but in most European
countries it is possible for ruling parties to enact and implement
health reform legislation. Thus, for example, Germany adopted major
health care reforms in 1988, 1992, 1997, and 1999, s" while Britain
made significant changes in its health care system during the
Thatcher administration and again when Labor returned to power
s83
By contrast, the governing institutions of the U.S. were in fact de-
signed to block radical change.8 4 The current situation in which both
houses of Congress and the Presidency are controlled by the same po-
litical party is a marked deviation from the norm of divided govern-
ment that has prevailed in the United States over the past half century.
Members of Congress are not, in general, dependent on the President
for their jobs, and are relatively free to pursue their own course on
health policy s Senators often have their own power bases and shape
their policy to reflect the ideology and the special interests of their own
states. Most House members currently run unopposed or with token
opposition, and are not dependent on the national party leadership for
reelection. Party discipline is at best, therefore, uneven.
Moreover, the rules of the Senate in particular militate against con-
trol by narrow majorities. Sixty votes are necessary to break a fili-
buster orto deviate from budget rules.8 6 Some level of consensus and
cross-party support is necessary, therefore, to adopt health reform leg-
islation. Perhaps most importantly, the presence of veto points
throughout the American political process gives interest groups op-
posed to legislation extraordinary opportunities to block it or water
it down.8 7 The rough road traversed and close victory achieved by the
recent Medicare Modernization Act, which had strong backing from
the President and the leadership of Republican majorities in both
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Houses, attests to the difficulties of making changes in the U.S. health
care systems. It is difficult to imagine the political stars that would
have to converge to bring about universal health coverage.
The federal system of the U.S. also militates against the adoption
of universal coverage. Though a number of countries that have uni-
versal health care systems are also federal states, social welfare pro-
grams tend to be weaker in such countries.8 8 Throughout the nine-
teenth century and into the 1930s, it was generally believed in the
United States that responsibility for social welfare resided in the
states, and that the U.S. federal government lacked the constitu-
tional authority to enact universal health insurance.8 9 When the fed-
eral government enacted public assistance programs in the 1930s, it
acted through the states.90 The Medicaid program was built on this
model in the 1960s, and there still seems to be strong support for the
notion that providing health coverage through Medicaid-like state
programs.91 The preemption provisions of the Employment Retire-
ment Income Security Act (ERISA) - and fears of business out-mi-
gration - on the other hand, make it effectively impossible for states
that would like to adopt universal health coverage on their own to
move ahead by building on the established foundation of employ-
ment-based group coverage through the use of an employer man-
date. 92 In addition, state constitutional restraints on taxation and
borrowing make it difficult for states to create public programs, and
renders them dependent upon the federal government, and its health
policy and programs, for leadership in extending coverage.9 3 Liberal
states, on the one hand, have been blocked with moving forward
with health care reform, while regional conservatism (and indeed,
frankly, racism) has played a major role in the past in blocking uni-
versal federal initiatives to address the problem.
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The U.S. Social Culture and Character
Second, there is the cultural aversion of Americans to the use of gov-
ernment to solve problems, and in particular, to the creation of so-
cial welfare programs. We like to believe that private know-how and
entrepreneurialism can solve all problems, even ones such as health
care coverage lapses and excessively high spending levels, which so
obviously and consistently defeat the power of even the most creative
entrepreneur.
Indeed, it is far from obvious that the American people want their
government to adopt universal coverage, or at least that they want it
enough to push their lawmakers into doing something about it. Eu-
ropean health care systems reflect a deeply rooted belief in the im-
portance of social solidarity, a value that is widely shared across the
citizenry.95 Even though the welfare state lacks the support in Europe
that it enjoyed a generation ago, and most European countries have
experimented with harnessing market forces in health care delivery
and financing, there is still strong support for universal health care
and little support for turning health care coverage over to the caprice
of markets.
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Americans are far more ambivalent about universal coverage.
Though a strong majority of Americans believe that legislation should
be passed to help the uninsured, consensus evaporates when specific
approaches to accomplishing this goal are discussed.9 7 There is con-
siderably more support for solutions like expanding state Medicaid
programs or increasing employer coverage than for creating a new na-
tional health insurance, and a majority of those polled usually oppose
substantial tax increases to expand coverage.98 Although the Clinton
plan seemed to enjoy strong popular support at the outset, this sup-
port evaporated once the public was convinced that it would result in
government control over health care, higher taxes, and health care
rationing.
9 9
It is also arguably true that Americans - particularly those who are
reasonably affluent, well insured, and able to get the ear of politicians
- do not mind spending more on health care than do other nations.
The French spend more on food than we do, the British more on hous-
ing. It appears that Americans simply have a taste for spending more
on health care.10 0 We are the richest nation on earth, and wealthy na-
tions tend to spend a higher proportion of their national product on
health care than poorer nations. 0 1 We clearly are enamored by health
care technology, and expect to have it available when and where we
want it.1
0 2
Nevertheless, the economic market for health care and political
market for health care policy are so distorted in the United States, that
it is difficult to believe that we have the mixture of cost and access that
most Americans would choose, given a choice. Indeed, the peculiar
nature of the political marketplace in the United States seems to ex-
plain much about the peculiar nature of our health policy.
A Weak Left and Limited Government
A third factor is the lack of a strong left wing in American politics,
(and the presence of a strong right wing) and also the weakened na-
ture of the American labor movement. The lack of a powerful left wing
labor movement in the U.S. has been a particularly important factor
in explaining the American rejection of the welfare state.'0 3 Orga-
nized labor has never been as strong here as in Europe and has seen
a more precipitous decline in its membership in recent decades.'
0 4
But perhaps even more important, labor has not been the political
force in the U.S. that it has been in Europe. We have no labor party
or labor-based socialist parties., 5 Though labor unions are tradi-
tionally associated with the Democratic Party, they have not histori-
cally dominated that party.0 6 Most importantly, organized labor has
focused traditionally more on private benefits for its members to be
gained through collective bargaining than on public welfare benefits
to be obtained through political action.'0 7 Indeed, Samuel Gompers
and his AFL played a major role in defeating national health insur-
ance when it was first mooted in the second decade of the twentieth
century because he preferred to retain union control over benefit
programs.'
0 8
The weakness of the left in the United States is matched, moreover,
with a powerful right wing. Right wing pressure groups like the
Christian Coalition played a major role in defeating the Clinton
plan.10 9 Public relations-savvy conservative think tanks like the Her-
itage Foundation have managed very successfully to keep the media
focused on their market-oriented proposals for health care system
organization, and distracted from exploring reform ideas that might
actually work here because they have worked elsewhere." 0
The Power of Special Interest Groups
in Opposing Reform
Perhaps an even more important political factor in explaining our
peculiar American situation has been the role of special interests
that oppose universal health coverage in American politics."' As
Robert Evans has often pointed out, in health care as elsewhere in the
economy, one person's cost is another person's income or profit." 2 We
spend currently $1.6 trillion on health care, and millions of individ-
uals have a massive investment in the continuation of the current
system." 3 On the other hand, American political campaigns are par-
ticularly expensive by international comparison. Special interest
groups contribute freely to American politicians, and expect that
their interests will be attended to."14 The recently adopted Medicare
bill, loaded with special interest provisions, especially its prohibition
against government "interference" with price negotiations between
drug benefit plans and pharmaceutical companies, is a classic exam-
ple of the pork barrel character of American health care politics.
Doctors throughout the world have tended to oppose government
involvement in the health care system, at least initially."' Not sur-
prisingly, the American Medical Association played a peculiarly im-
portant role in opposing the adoption of universal health insurance,
particularly in the middle of the twentieth century when it was at the
peak of its political power." 6 But provider interests have not been
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alone in this. Business and employer groups h
effective in opposing health care reform. Tho
ployment-based system is burdensome to them
control over benefit costs and structures, and g
attracting workers." 7 They also fear the higher
company a government-run system. Busines
leading role, for example, in defeating the Clin
Perhaps the most important impediment to
the present time, however, is the commercial ins
care lobby?' 9 Though private health insurance
many in the 1880s and Britain in the 1940s, it
generally offered by nonprofit fraternal and mut
did not pose a significant political obstacle to th
versal system.' 20 Countries that use a social in
coverage, moreover, in general initially co-o
health insurers by permitting them to operate t
trast, health insurance and managed care are
ential forces in the U.S., as they demonstrated ti
Louise" commercials. This series of commerci
when the Clinton Health Plan was under deb
clearly affluent couple expressing their concern,
about what the plan would do to them, helpe
insurers' power in Congress guaranteed that
the Medicare prescription drug legislation
would include, by the Administration's ac-
count, $46 billion dollars in subsidies over
the next ten years to entice managed care




The Stickiness of What Is
Though each of these accounts of American
exceptionalism has explanatory power,124 in the
plausible explanations is the theory of path del
has been popularized in the health policy areaby
book, Accidental Logics, which recognizes that,
try is exceptional. 25 The notion of path depen
power of inertia within political institutions. On
habit of doing things in a particular way, they t
them that way.
This is not a theory of historical determinism
to time "critical moments or junctures" appear
fluence of factors in the broader political arena
tional changes in health care systems possible.
social insurance system was created by a power
lor faced by a strong socialist challenge in the
lowing German unification in the late 19th centu
tional Health Service was established as the
receiving a decisive political mandate followi
War II, turned its hand to rebuilding a devast
tem. 2s The Spanish and Portuguese national
into being as those countries emerged from
dictatorships. 1 9 The Dutch social insurance sy
the German occupation during World War II.13
in the American health care system, the creat
Medicaid in 1965, resulted from the landslid
Johnson, which brought into power for the fi
working majority of liberal and moderate nortl
Democrats."' There are few examples of situs
health services simply evolved, though the Sc
health services may represent this possibility.
At this point in time, it appears particularly u'
a window of opportunity will open any time so
form. The conservative Republicans who currer
cave also proved very branches of the federal government are aggressively hostile to social
ugh the present em- welfare programs. 32 The tax cuts enacted since 2000, combined with
it at least gives them high military spending and subsidies for favored businesses, have re-
,ives them a means of sulted, apparently intentionally, in massive budget deficits that make
r taxes that would ac- any major new social initiative almost unthinkable. 33
s coalitions played a But countries do change. One impressive fact when one reviews the
ton plan."8  history of universal health coverage throughout the world is how re-
universal coverage at cently many countries have adopted it. Switzerland only established
surance and managed a system of universal coverage in 1996 and Israel in 1995, while the
existed in both Ger- Australian system dates only from 1984. The Spanish and Portuguese
was in both instances national health systems were created in 1986 and 1989 respectively.
ual organizations that One can, just barely, imagine a scenario in which a universal health
e nactment of a uni- care system might become politically viable in the U.S. If, for exam-
isurance approach to ple, our employer-based health insurance system continues to im-
pted existing private plode, driven on by the risk-segmentation that will result if employ-
the system. 21 By con- ers abandon relatively well subsidized defined-benefit health plans
important and influ- (plans that provide employee with a defined set of benefits and rela-
rough the "Harry and tively well articulated coverage standards ) in exchange for poorly
als in the early 1990s subsidized defined-contribution health plans (which offer employees
bate, which showed a only a limited sum of money to procure coverage), the number of
s over the dinner table uninsured - and seriously underinsured - Americans will continue
d kill it.12 2 Similarly, to grow. At some point, a critical mass of the uninsured will consist
of politically active, middle class Americans,
who will demand a response from the gov-
Americans who cannot afford ernment. At some point, moreover, doctors,
and perhaps even drug companies will feel
to pay for health care and the pinch as more and more Americans are
do not have health insurance priced out of the market for their goods and
are effectively denied access to services. Hospitals, moreover, will face an
increasing uncompensated care burden. At
non-emergency care. the same time, the political pendulum may
sweep back toward the left, and a majority of
Americans may become more comfortable
e end, one of the most with a larger role for government in the American health care system.
sendency. This theory Perhaps the opposition of business to national health insurance will
Carolyn Tuohy in her soften as employees become ever more dissatisfied with ever more
in a sense, every coun- limited health coverage. Perhaps insurers may ultimately conclude
dency emphasizes the that they are better off trying to find a role in a national health in-
ce nations get into the surance system, perhaps as claims processors and fiscal intermedi-
end to keep on doing aries, than to chance a fight to the death. Perhaps the day will come
when we do health care finance pretty much like other countries do
c, however. From time it. We will never do it just like they do it, however, in part because
7 when a polity a con- "they" do not do it in any one particular way. The British health care
makes major institu- system is different from the German system -which in turn are dif-
16 Thus the German ferent from the Canadian or Irish systems. But that is the beauty of
rful German chancel- it. In the wealth of experience that the world has had with providing
tumultuous time fol- universal health insurance, there is a world of ideas for us to draw on
ury. 27 The British Na- - in terms of broad models for carrying out universal coverage, in
Labor Party, which, terms of technical approaches to addressing technical problems, and
ng the end of World in even in terms of political strategies for bringing universal cover-
:ated health care sys- age into existence. The ideas, the models, even the technology is
health services came there. We only have to decide that we want it.
long-standing fascist
'stem was imposed by
0 The greatest change
:ion of Medicare and
de victory of Lyndon




nlikely that in the U.S.
on for health care re-
itly dominate all three
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